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Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the
Parklane Doctrine
MAURICE J. HOLLAND*

FROM RULE TO DISCRETION

The enormous expansion in the scope of application of the doctrine of res judicata in recent decades is an often remarked phe-

nomenon.1 With respect to the merger and bar, or claim preclusion,2 branch of the doctrine, this expansion is primarily
attributable to the enlarged, transactionally defined concept of a
"claim," in lieu of the more restricted "cause of action," as the
minimum permissible unit of litigation in modern civil practice.3
With respect to the collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,4 branch
of the doctrine, the widespread and growing repudiation of the requirement of mutuality of estoppel' is doubtless the single factor
* A.B. 1958, Yale University;, LL.M. 1970, Harvard University. Associate Professor of
Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. Grateful acknowledgement is due my
Indiana University colleagues, Professors Harry Pratter, Edwin Greenebaum and Dirk
Hartog, for stimulating my thinking, and for suggesting pertinent reading, related to the
topic of this article. Thanks are also due to Ms. Susan Willey for research assistance.
' See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CiVIm PROCEDURE 531 (2d ed. 1977); Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion:Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 357 (1974); Comment, The Expanding
Scope of the Res JudicataBar, 54 Tix. L. REv. 527 (1976).
' The term "merger and bar" and the more recent coinage, "claim preclusion," are synonymous, and refer to the effect of an adjudication on the merits of a claim in extinguishing
the claim, as well as any defense to it, either by merging the claim in the judgment if for the
claimant or by barring further suit upon it if for the opponent. See A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-43 to V-48 (1969). "Issue preclusion," like its twin, "claim preclusion,"
see note 4 infra, seems to be gaining ground as the preferred usage and has been adopted in
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-5, 1973-1978). The law of former
adjudication is fraught with confused terminology. Some writers, including the eminent Professor Moore, apply the label "res judicata" only to merger and bar, as distinct from collateral estoppel. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAICE 1 0.405[3] (2d ed. 1974). This article
will follow the more general practice of using the term to refer to both merger and bar and
collateral estoppel.
3 See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 541-57.
4 "Collateral estoppel," or "issue preclusion" in the newer parlance, refers to the preclusive effect of the determination of a given issue in one adjudication upon relitigation of the
same issue in subsequent litigation. See 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, 0.441[2].
' The mutuality requirement requires, for collaterally estopping a party from relitigating
a previously determined issue, that the opposing party would have been similarly bound by
an adverse determination of the same issue. Since it has been generally assumed that only
one who is a party, or in privity with a party, can be bound by the outcome of a litigation,
the practical effect of the mutuality requirement was, and remains in the diminishing number of jurisdictions which still adhere to it, to confine the operation of collateral estoppel to
subsequent litigation between the same parties or their privies. This restriction, when com-
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most responsible for its expanded application. In both of its manifestations, the more frequent recourse to res judicata has been encouraged by the steadily increasing concern with backlogged civil
dockets, even as it has proved an important means of addressing
that concern by enforcing consolidation of litigation in the interest
of conserving judicial resources.
This broadening of scope has brought with it a remarkable
transformation in the substance and structure of res judicata.
Classically, as propounded in such seminal nineteenth-century
cases as Cromwell v. County of Sac,' res judicata was a doctrine of
finality expressed and implemented through a cluster of axiomatic
rules of law specific in form, absolute in force, and mandatory in
application. These rules were specific in the sense that cases to
which they properly applied were thought to be clearly distinguishable from those to which they were not solely by reference to the
terms in which they were stated. They were absolute in the sense
of controlling results without regard to any competing elements of
decision, which is merely to say that they were genuine rules of
law.7 Finally, they were mandatory in that their controlling effect
bined with the doctrine of merger and bar, allows a relatively narrow range of application
for collateral estoppel, since it can only be invoked in subsequent litigation between parties
or their privies having issues identical to those determined in prior litigation between them,
but at the same time not precluded by merger or bar. The expanding requirement that
compulsory counterclaims be interposed in the first action arising out of a given transaction
or occurrence, combined with the latitudinarian construction accorded to the concept of a
single transaction or occurrence, has further limited the application of collateral estoppel in
jurisdictions where mutuality of estoppel is still required.
Among the earliest, and surely the most renowned and influential, American opinions explicitly rejecting the mutuality requirement was Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). Partly because of the eminence of the author of the Bernhard
opinion, Justice Roger Traynor, the movement away from mutuality soon gathered force,
and it now obtains in an ever diminishing number of jurisdictions. It is currently doubtful
that, as Professor Moore asserted in the 1974 edition of his treatise, most federal and state
courts still adhere to mutuality. Compare 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, 0.412[1], at 1803-06
with id. 0.412[1], at 119-22 (Cum. Supp., J. Lucas ed. 1978). The triumph of the Bernhard
doctrine, as the abandonment of mutuality has come to be known, has been capped by its
acceptance in the new Restatement of Judgments. Compare RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §
93 (1942) with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
6 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
* Much could have, and has, been said by way of defining rules of law and differentiating
them from other legal precepts, but for purposes of this article, the author accepts the following definition:
A rule of law is a precept attaching a precisely defined fixed consequence to
a definite detailed fact or state of facts. There is no scope given for application
to circumstances. The cases are fitted to the straightjacket of the rule, not the
rule shaped in its application to the circumstances of fact of the case.
Pound, Discretion, Dispensation,and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special
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was not subject to equitable dispensation or qualification on
grounds of general notions of fairness or justice in particular
cases. 8 In the manner of the formal or, to use the pejorative
description later applied to it by Roscoe Pound,' "mechanical" jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century, the rules of res judicata
were thought to embody in themselves every consideration of fairness or justice which judges were entitled to take into account.10
Even a cursory comparison of court opinions and scholarly literCase, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 925, 927 (1960); see Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L.
REv. 14, 22-24 (1967); Raz, Legal Principlesand the Limits of Law, 81 YALz L.J. 823 (1972).
A rule of law may, of course, be invalidated, abandoned or limited by exceptions, but within
whatever remains of its acknowledged scope of application, it cannot properly be deprived
of its full governing effect without ceasing to be a rule.
" See, e.g., Wulfgen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 2d 891, 896, 151 P.2d 846, 849 (1944):
If plaintiff, through negligence in not properly presenting her claim in the
first instance, has lost her right to recover money.., it is a hardship but one
from which the courts cannot relieve if the general and well-established rule
against the splitting of a single cause of action is to be allowed for the benefit
of all.
' Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
"0Thus, a leading treatise writer on the subject of judgments in the heyday of legal formalism wrote as follows:
That the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state of facts, should be regarded as a
final and conclusive determination of the question litigated... [i]s more than
a mere rule of law. It is more even than an important principle of public policy.
It is not too much to say that this maxim is a fundamental concept in the
organization of every jural society. For unless every judgment should at some
point become final, and have the quality of establishing its contents as irrefragable truth, litigation would become interminable, the rights of parties would
be involved in endless confusion, the courts, stripped of their most efficient
powers, would become little more than advisory bodies, and thus the most important function of government-that of ascertaining and enforcing
rights-would go unfulfilled ....
Out of the multiplicity of controversies that
have come before them, presenting a thousand minute shades of difference,
[the courts] have framed continually more and more detailed rules for the application of the main principle. In this way ... the jurisprudence of the subject has attained a breadth, a depth, and a closeness of texture, which would
seem to promise an immediate precedent for the decision of any imaginable
case.
2 H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 500, at 599-600 (1891). These pronouncements did not represent merely the musings of a doctrinaire scholar; they were
echoed in many judicial opinions of the period, of which the following excerpt from an opinion of Justice Campbell is not unrepresentative:
[T]he maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families, require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals
shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in [Louisiana's] jurisprudence, that commentators upon it have said
that res judicata renders white that which is black, and straight that which is
crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum.
Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859).
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ature on the subject of res judicata dating from the era of judicial
formalism 1 -an era whose apogee occurred in the closing decades
of the nineteenth century but whose style of decision persisted well
into the twentieth-with their modern counterparts will reveal
both the extent and character of the transformation of the doctrine, which can perhaps best be epitomized as the displacement of
rule-orientation by a broadly equitable discretion as the predominant mode of decision. In recent decades, there seems to have developed a nearly universal agreement among judges and scholarly
commentators alike that res judicata cannot be soundly administered by means of resolute adherence to a battery of self-enclosed
rules of the kind so confidently pronounced by Justice Field in
Cromwell v. County of Sac1 2 as constituting the sole and sufficient

grounds of decision in cases involving the preclusive effect of judgments.13 Res judicata has in the process largely sloughed off the
marked rule-orientation by which it was characterized in its former, or what might be termed its common law, incarnation. It has
become imbued with the administrative traditions of equity litigation, whereby each proceeding has been thought of as a phase in a
connected and on-going process, whereby joinder of claims and
parties has been treated in a broadly pragmatic and malleable
fashion, and wherein matters have been regarded as concluded
only in a more or less provisional way, subject to being reopened,
re-examined, and readjusted to take account of subsequent events;
all in sharp contrast to the common law model of adjudication,
which has tended to fragment disputes, handle them in the narrowest, most discrete possible mold, and to encapsulate each proceeding by investing its conclusion with nearly unqualified finality.
In a manner strikingly paralleling the contemporaneous change
that has occurred in the adjacent field of choice of law, with its
" On the content and historical periodization of judicial formalism, see G. WHrrE, PAT101-02, 166-72 (1978); Pound, The Theory of Judicial
Decision II, 36 HAnv. L. Rav. 802 (1923).
12 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
"3 Cases modifying or dispensing with the black letter precepts of res judicata either in
the interest of attaining a just result in a particular case or of giving effect to one or another
policy deemed of paramount importance are too numerous to cite. Leading cases of such
tenor are collected and approvingly discussed in 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, 1 0.405110][11]. See generally Degnan, FederalizedRes Judicata,85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976); Hazard, Res
Nova in Res Judicata,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1036 (1971); Semmel, CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality, and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. Rv. 1457 (1968); Vestal, Res JudicatalPreclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MIcH. L. Rav. 1723 (1968);
Note, Res Judicata:Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court
Determinations,53 VA. L. Rv. 1360 (1967).
TERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
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movement away from preoccupation with certainty of result to be
achieved through unblinking application of black-letter rules, as
exemplified in the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and in the

direction of multifaceted analysis and balancing of competing and
vaguely defined governmental and private interests and relationships as exemplified in the second, 14 res judicata has assumed

many aspects of public law. By this is meant that it has become
less exclusively focused upon honoring a priori rights of litigants
supposedly created by previous judgments, and more concerned

with balancing a desire to achieve a "fair" result in individual
cases against the public policy dictate of efficient and economical
1,A

comparison of RESTATEMENT

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

OND) Or CONFLICT oF LAWS (1971) at almost any point will

(1934) with

RESTATEMENT (SEc-

illustrate the shift away from the

rule orientation of the former toward the rather general, often amorphous "principles" of
the latter. This and other differences in approach are discussed in Von Mehren, Recent
Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNrLL L. Rpv. 927, 963 (1975). A remarkably
similar difference will be apparent from a comparison of RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (1942)
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-5, 1973-1978). A prime example is afforded by contrasting the former's mode of expressing exceptions, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 69, 71-72 (1942), to the basic rule of collateral estoppel as to questions of fact, id. § 68, which were cast in the form of square-cornered rules, with
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) ("Exceptions to the
General Rule of Issue Preclusion") which states:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of
the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the
following circumstances:
(a) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of
law, have obtained review of the judgment by an appellate court in the initial
action; or
(b) The issue is one of law and (i) the two actions involve claims that are
substantially unrelated, or (ii) a new determination is warranted in order to
take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; or
(c) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors
relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; or
(d) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier
burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the
subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adversary
has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action; or
(e) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue
(i) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public
interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties to the initial action,
(ii) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action
that the issue would arise in the context of the subsequent action, or (iii) because the party sought to be concluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or
incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.
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management of litigation. In choice of law this fundamental alteration has been importantly facilitated by the nearly complete jettisoning of the "vested rights" theory, whereby it was supposed

that litigants had an entitlement, almost in the nature of a property right, to application of the substantive law of a particular jurisdiction identified by reference to axiomatic rules. Similarly with
res judicata, its leavening by generous admixtures of equitable discretion and permeation by qualifying considerations of public policy 1'5 have been accompanied by a total abandonment of the onceheld notion that the preclusive effects of judgments are matters of
substantive right akin to property. 16
15Res judicata, of course, expresses the public policy of economizing judicial resources by
enforcing consolidation of related claims and by precluding relitigation of questions once
determined. This policy is congruent with the interest of individual litigants, at least prevailing litigants, in finality. In recent decades, largely owing to the broadened scope of both
merger and bar, and collateral estoppel, both the public policy underlying res judlicata and
litigants' interest in finality have come to be opposed by certain countervailing public policies, of which by far the most important has been maintaining the primacy of federal courts
in determining questions of federal law and questions of fact as to which federal law is
applicable. In many instances, res judicata has yielded to this supposedly paramount policy.
For a list of some of the more important cases, see 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 1
0.405111], at 783-87. Overriding of the normal operation of res judicata tends to occur when
it would preclude a federal court, as a consequence of a prior state court judgment, from
adjudicating a claim, defense, or issue implicating federal law, particularly in such areas as
civil rights or bankruptcy, where the policy of preserving the primacy of federal courts is
regarded as especially compelling. The Federal Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255
(1976), represents a statutory modification of the normal principles of res judicata in the
interest of the latter policy. For a discussion of the general problem, see Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 317 (1978); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil
Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 859 (1976); Note, The
Preclusive Effect of State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. Rlv. 610
(1978); Note, The CollateralEstoppel Effect of PriorState Court Findings in Cases Within
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction,91 HARV. L. Rav. 1281 (1978); Note, Developments in the
Law: Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARv. L. 1Ev. 1133, 1330 (1977).
16 While the notion that prevailing litigants have something akin to a vested or property
right in the preclusive effect of a judgment is not wholly implausible with respect to merger
and bar, it would strike any student of modern res judicata as preposterous if applied to
collateral estoppel, and it certainly finds no recognition in modern decisions. In the era of
rule-oriented res judicata, however, such a conception does seem to have prevailed. Thus, a
leading treatise writer asserted:
Every judgment directly enforces some right or suppresses some wrong,
thereby producing the end sought by every humanely conceived law. Its incidental results, extending far beyond the time at which it is pronounced, and
the parties whose rights it determines, attach themselves to property or to
privies in blood or in estate, and continue in binding force and obligation for
an indefinite period of time.
1 A. FREAN, A TREATiSE OF THE LAw OF JUDGMENTS § 1, at 3 (1925); accord, Kessler v.
Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 288-89 (1907):
This judgment, whether it proceeds upon good reasons, whether it was right
or wrong, settled finally and everywhere . . . that Kessler had the right to
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By its decision in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore,17 the Supreme
Court has lent important renewed impetus to the trend toward investing collateral estoppel with the raiment of equitable discretion.
The occasion for the Court's approval of trial courts exercising
"broad discretion" 18 in deciding whether to permit the invocation
of collateral estoppel was also the occasion for its first explicit approval of so-called offensive issue preclusion under circumstances
of non-mutuality of estoppel.19 The case affords an apt illustration
manufacture, use and sell the electric cigar lighter before the court. The court,
having before it the respective rights and duties... of the parties to the litigation, conclusively decreed the right of Kessler to manufacture and sell his
manufactures free from all interference from Eldred by virtue of the Chambers
patent, and the corresponding duty of Eldred to recognize and yield to that
right everywhere and always .... If rights between litigants are once established by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction those rights
must be recognized in every way... by those who are bound by it.
The New Jersey Court of Chancery put the matter even more emphatically in Mayor of
Patterson v. Baker, 51 N.J. Eq. 49, 59, 26 A. 324, 327 (1893):
[Collateral estoppel] is not a mere rule of procedure, limited in its operation,
and only to be enforced in cases where a defeated suitor attempts to litigate
anew a question once heard and decided against him, but a rule of justice,
unlimited in its operation, which must be enforced whenever its enforcement is
necessary for the protection and security of rights, and for the preservation of
the repose of society.
Aside from the almost mystical reverence accorded to judgments and their asserted finality during the era of formal jurisprudence, it is difficult to account satisfactorily for the
association of collateral estoppel with vested rights. It might have stemmed in part from the
fact that, prior to the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
subsequent adoption by many states of rules modeled upon them, very few American jurisdictions required counterclaims as such, however closely bound up with the principal claim
pleaded in an action, to be interposed therein. R. Miumt, CIVIL PoC=uRE OF THE TRIAL
COURT rs I OIucAL PRanSPxCTxv 135-39 (1952). Absent such a requirement as a matter of
merger or bar, the difficulty of distinguishing true counterclaims from affirmative defenses,
set-offs, and recoupments, all of which did have to be pleaded in the first instance, might
well have encouraged the view that very stringent enforcement of the rubrics of collateral
estoppel was necessary to ensure that parties were not deprived of the direct benefits of
their judgment, clearly a matter of substantive right, through relitigation of issues determined in support thereof under the guise of a counterclaim asserted in a subsequent independent proceeding. In any event, the detachment of collateral estoppel in recent decades
from substantive rights has proved important for the shift from rue-orientation to discretion, since our legal system is more comfortable with avowed discretion in matters denominated as procedural. Modern res judicata doctrine recognizes, at most, a procedural interest,
but surely not a vested right, of a prevailing party not to be required to relitigate an issue
previously determined in his favor, just as it recognizes a public interest in avoiding the
costs of repetitious adjudication. Interests, unlike rights, can be legitimately curtailed or
subordinated to opposing interests when the sound exercise of judicial discretion calls for
such a result.
17

439 U.S. 322 (1978).

IS Id.

at 331.
"The case that gave its name to the doctrine whereby mutuality of estoppel was dispensed with as a requirement for collateral estoppel, Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.
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of how each successive step in broadening the application of preclusion techniques tends to be accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the parameters of permissible discretion within which
they are to be implemented.
THE

Parklane DECISION

It would be difficult to imagine a set of circumstances more
auspicious for recourse to non-mutual offensive issue preclusion
than that of Parklane.The case involved a stockholder class action
2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), involved what came to be known as defensive issue preclusion
or defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. This term refers to the situation wherein a
claimant, usually a plaintiff, against whom an issue was determined in litigation against a
given opponent is then precluded from relitigating that issue in a subsequent action against
a different opponent. The latter is said to invoke preclusion against relitigation of the issue
common to the initial and subsequent actions defensively. The traditional requirement of
mutuality would, generally, have disallowed any use of collateral estoppel, i.e., issue preclusion, unless the opponent in the subsequent action was the same as, or in privity with, the
party in whose favor the common issue was determined in the initial litigation.
In the years immediately following Bernhard, most jurisdictions which adopted its doctrine limited the dispensation with the mutuality requirement to cases involving defensive
preclusion. See Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata,65 HARv. L. REv. 820, 862-65
(1952). By the 1960's, however, a considerable number of state and lower federal courts had
abandoned the distinction between defensive and offensive preclusion, and had thus abolished the mutuality requirement across the board. See 1B J. MooRE, supra note 2,
0.412[1], at 1805-12; id. 0.411, at 107-11 (Cum. Supp. Lucas ed. 1978). In 1967, the New
York Court of Appeals pronounced the mutuality requirement "a dead letter" in that jurisdiction. B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967). This development,
sanctioning offensive preclusion under circumstances of non-mutuality, meant that a claimant not a party to an initial action wherein an issue was determined adversely to his present
opponent could invoke preclusion as to that issue affirmatively or offensively against such
opponent provided the latter was a party to the initial action and had had a "fair and full
opportunity" to litigate the common issue therein.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in several of the lower federal court cases wherein
non-mutual collateral estoppel was permitted to be used defensively or offensively. See, e.g.,
Zdanock v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964) (offensive
collateral estoppel). In 1971, the Court overruled Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), and
approved the defensive use of collateral estoppel against a patentee in an infringement action on the basis of a determination of invalidity of the same patent in a prior action by the
same patentee against a different alleged infringer. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Justice White's opinion stressed that
there was no longer a rule against, or in favor of, defensive preclusion absent mutuality of
estoppel, but that the question was to be determined on the basis of whether the party
against whom preclusion is urged had "'a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and
evidentially to prove his claim the first timge."' Id. at 333 (quoting Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D. Mass. 1960)). Although much of the language of the
Blonder-Tongue opinion was addressed to considerations especially pertinent to patent infringement litigation, taken as a whole it could be said to have fairly anticipated the generalized approval of non-mutual collateral estoppel, to be implemented with discretion on a
case-by-case basis, along the lines finally approved in Parklane.
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against Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. and several of its officers,
directors, and controlling shareholders, in which the defendants
were alleged to have violated various sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 193420 and pertinent regulations by issuing a false
and misleading proxy statement in connection with a "going private" merger. The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, sought damages, rescission of
the merger, and recovery of costs. Prior to the trial of this action,
but subsequent to its commencement, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) obtained, in a separate proceeding for injunctive relief in the same court, a declaratory judgment to the effect
that the proxy statement in question contained materially false
and misleading statements.2 1 In the SEC proceeding, only the corporation and its president, who was also the owner of a controlling
block of shares, were named as defendants. Invoking this declaratory judgment, the plaintiff in the shareholder's action moved for
summary judgment on the issue of the material falsity and misleading character of the proxy statement. The district court denied
the motion on the ground that to collaterally estop the corporation
and its president from relitigating this issue would deprive them of
their right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the seventh amendment,
since no jury had determined this question in the SEC litigation. 2
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1970).
2 SEC v. Parkane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (1976), af['d, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir.
1977). The injunction was denied because the district judge found no likelihood of future
violations. Appointment of special counsel to appraise the Parklane shares was also refused.
22 Since damages, among other forms of relief, were sought in the stockholders' action, a
jury would, at the behest of any party thereto, have determined anew all issues bearing
upon defendants' liability, including the issue of whether the proxy statement was materially false and misleading, which was decided adversely to the defendants in the SEC injunction suit. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959). The estoppel sought by plaintiff in the stockholders' action would not,
of course, have extended to those officer and director defendants not joined in the SEC
proceeding. To obviate this difficulty, the plaintiff agreed that, in the event the motion for
partial summary judgment were granted, he would drop the additional, non-common defendants. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 821 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977). Clearly the remedy of rescission of the merger could be granted against the corporation and its controlling
shareholder alone, but since the money damage liability asserted was joint and several, a
serious question might arise as to whether, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a), the
additional defendants could be properly dismissed, at least if the remaining individual defendant would be entitled to contribution from among those who were dropped. This is
because the practical effect of a right to contribution is to convert joint and several liability
into joint liability considered from the perspective of joint tortfeasors inter se. Since the
district court denied the estoppel motion and published no opinion, it can only be surmised
that this issue was not addressed by it. Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court
adverted to it in their respective opinions. An alternative to dropping the additional defen-
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The order denying the motion was certified as a controlling question of law for purposes of interlocutory appeal,"3 and the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the offensive use of collateral estoppel sought by the plaintiff stockholders was fair, in accordance

with sound judicial policy, and not violative of the seventh amend-

ment.2 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 25 in order to resolve
an intercircuit conflict between the court of appeals decision in
this case and the Fifth Circuit decision in Rachal v. Hill,26 and
approved the former.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court forthrightly acknowledged the important respects in which non-mutual collateral estoppel differs when used defensively, as approved in Blonder-Tongue
2 7 as opLaboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
posed to when it is invoked offensively. First, allowing a defensive
use of the technique will conduce to joinder in a single action of as
many defendants as venue and jurisdictional limitations permit by
a plaintiff having related claims 28 against them. This is because if a
plaintiff proceeds against defendants singly, the first adverse determination of the common issue will impede, in fact will most often
wholly defeat, prosecution of related claims against the remaining
defendants,29 whereas a favorable determination will not be binding upon the latter.30 When offensive use is permitted, a number of
dants would have been to hold that their interests were so closely identified with those of
the corporate and controlling shareholder defendants in the SEC proceeding as to warrant
precluding them on that basis, though there appears to be no direct authority for such an
extension of the notion of "privity." Another alternative would have been to sever the trial
of the claims against the additional defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b), but such a step would have forfeited the gains in judicial economy achieved by estopping the common defendants.
23 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
U'Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
" 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
26 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). This decision was criticized, with elegant learning, in Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill,
85 HARv.L. REv. 442 (1971). The historical analysis in this article was drawn upon substantially by the Supreme Court in its Parklane opinion.
402 U.S. 313 (1971).
13 By "related claims" is meant claims with one or more identical issues of fact or law. An
apt illustration is afforded by Blonder-Tongue, id., where the issue of patent validity, a
mixed question of law and fact, would obviously be identical as it arose in each claim of
infringement.
29 Issues of fact or law common to a number of related claims will nearly always be those
bearing upon, and often dispositive of, liability, as opposed to the measure of recovery.
1* The Parklane opinion reiterated the traditional doctrine that a judgment cannot bind
one who was not a party, or in privity with a party. 439 U.S. at 327 n.7 (citing BlonderTongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), and
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plaintiffs with related claims against one or more defendants will
derive incentive therefrom to avoid consolidation or joinder to the
extent possible, since the first favorable determination of a common issue will inure to the benefit of any plaintiffs whose actions
have not gone to judgment. This consideration was not present in
Parklane,however, as the stockholder class which sought the benefit of collateral estoppel from the declaratory judgment in favor of
the SEC commenced its action before the Commission's and was
statutorily
prevented from consolidating its litigation with the
1
latter's.

3

Additionally, and more pertinent to the present discussion, offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel is fraught with possibilities
for unfairness to parties against whom it is utilized which are not
inherent in its defensive counterpart. These possibilities all derive
from the fact that a defendant faced with a number of related
claims against him will typically have little control over the nature
of the forum in which the first claim is litigated, or the magnitude
of the stakes therein. A defendant in such a situation might be
lacking either certain procedural advantages or sufficient incentive
to contest the adjudication of issues which turn out to be identical
with those which could prove dispositive in subsequent litigation of
related claims, where the size of the recovery sought and the availability of procedural devices, such as discovery, might prompt
stouter resistance or facilitate the defense. Of course, the problem
of inadequate incentive to contest the first adjudication of common
issues will disappear once the propriety of offensive non-mutual
collateral estoppel is established, at least when, as in Parklane,the
likelihood of related claims involving larger stakes is apparent to
the defendant from the outset.
Aside from the matter of jury trial, Justice Stewart's opinion
rightly noted that none of the possibilities for unfairness to the
defendants from allowance of the estoppel urged unsuccessfully in
the district court were presented by the circumstances of Parklane.3 2 The SEC proceeding, from which preclusion was sought,
was litigated in the same court as the stockholder suit, wherein
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)). In recent years, however, there have been limited
departures from this doctrine. See Note, CollateralEstoppel of Nonparties, 87 HAev. L.
REv. 1485 (1974).
3115 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976) provides in substance that no other action may be consolidated with one instituted by the SEC without the latter's consent. The SEC's policy is to
deny such consent. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae 30-31.
32 439 U.S. at 331-32.
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preclusion would operate to dispose of the common liability issues.
Thus, not only were the same opportunities for discovery and
other procedural advantages available to the defendants in the
SEC as in the stockholder action, but there could be no unfairness
on grounds of a remote or otherwise inconvenient venue in the former proceeding. Further, the stockholder action, with the magnitude of the claims involved, was not merely foreseeable; it was actually pending at the time the SEC suit was tried. The defendants

could not, to be sure, foresee with certainty that offensive collateral estoppel as invoked against them would ultimately be approved, but any unfairness on that score amounted to nothing
more than what is inherent in a regime of judicial law-making in
which prospective overruling is the exception rather than the rule.
Moreover, the precedents in the Supreme Court and Second Circuit upon which defendants might have relied to shield them from
such estoppel all long antedated Blonder-Tongue and had been so
eroded by the general shift in preclusion doctrine which
culminated in that decision that neither court felt obliged to accord them the dignity of an explicit overruling.
Because the circumstances of Parklane argued so strongly as a
matter of procedural fairness and judicial policy in favor of estopping the defendants common to both the SEC and the stockholder
actions, most of the discussion in both the Supreme Court and
court of appeals opinions was directed to the constitutional issue
presented by the case. 3 That issue was whether, consistently with
Of all the judges and justices who participated in the Parklane decision at the district
court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court levels, only Justice Rehnquist opposed the decision on nonconstitutional as well as constitutional grounds. There was no published opinion
from the district court judge. His order, however, is set forth in the course of the court of
appeals opinion as follows: "The within motion is denied. Rachal u. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th
Cir. 1970). So ordered." 565 F.2d at 818. In Rachal collateral estoppel was denied under the
supposed compulsion of the seventh amendment right to jury trial. The court of appeals
opinion reads as though only the constitutional impediment, which it concluded did not
exist, was worth extended discussion, so strong was the case for estoppel on the basis of
nonconstitutional considerations. Justice Rehnquist did not see it that way and objected to
the "respondent's 'heads I win, tails you lose' theory of this litigation." 439 U.S. at 338
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This recourse to a gambling metaphor recalls, though presumably not intended to do so, Jeremy Bentham's oft-quoted aspersion upon the mutuality doctrine as "a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to
the bench." 7 WoRs op Jmamn Bn.NTm 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). Whether one believes,
with Justice Rehnquist, that there is something inherently unfair about permitting a litigant
to benefit from a determination of an issue in a prior adjudication wherein he invested nothing, when an adverse determination could not be utilized by his opponent, depends upon
how far one is to carry over essentially intuitive notions of fairness from the context of
games and sports to that of litigation. In games, the outcome is usually supposed to have no
external determinant corresponding to the controlling rules of law and the actual facts in
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the seventh amendment, 4 the defendants against whom damages,
litigation. Furthermore, games are commonly regarded as being properly conducted when
victory goes to the participant having the greatest skill, exerting the greatest effort, or, perhaps, the one most favored by luck. None of these attributes is, of course, ideally true of
litigation and hence any objection to non-mutual collateral estoppel, whether offensive or
defensive, deriving from game analogies would seem to be misplaced. There are, to be sure,
possibilities of collateral estoppel, particularly of the offensive variety, functioning unfairly,
but these all arise from the internal dynamics of multiparty litigation. They were all addressed in Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court. See text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
A demonstration of the essential unfairness of collateral estoppel, especially under circumstances of non-mutuality, by recourse to probability theory rather than game analogies
was recently attempted in Note, A ProbabilisticAnalysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of
CollateralEstoppel, 76 MiCH. L. Rxv. 612 (1978). Here it is ingeniously argued that, even if
courts are Solomonically wise in administering non-mutual collateral estoppel on a discretionary basis and under the broad standard of "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" subsequently adopted in Parklane,the abandonment of the traditional mutuality requirement
will nonetheless result in an unfair allocation of the risk of erroneous outcome against the
common party. This analysis begins with an assumption which cannot be denied; namely,
that the outcome of any given litigation might be "erroneous" either because of misapprehension of the actual facts or misapplication of the law. Since no number of repeated retrials of the same case would, as a theoretical matter, totally avoid the possibility of error or
indicate which among divergent outcomes was "correct" in the sense of being in accord with
the actual facts and in conformity with pertinent legal standards, an erroneous outcome is
defined for purposes of this analysis as one contrary to the majority outcome that would
obtain were a particular claim retried an infinite number of times. The ratio of correct, i.e.,
majority, outcomes to incorrect, i.e., minority, outcomes, can of course never be known but,
hard as it may be for one unversed in the arcana of probability theory to accept, this is
irrelevant as long as one agrees that, as to any single trial of a claim, there is some statistical
possibility that its outcome will differ from the majority of outcomes were there an infinity
of retrials.
One example given posits that a plaintiff has related claims against 10 defendants of the
value of $100 each and that if these claims were retried an infinite number of times the
plaintiff would win 50% of the time. Thus, at any single trial the plaintiff has a 50% chance
of winning. This means that if the 10 claims were consolidated in a single trial, or if they are
tried separately without defensive collateral estoppel being operative, the plaintiff will have
a statistical expectancy of recovery of the value of $500. If, however, defendants in litigation
subsequent to the first one to go to judgment against the plaintiff are given the benefit of
defensive collateral estoppel, the plaintiff's statistical expectancy of recovery is reduced to
$100. This note also asserts, correctly from a probabilistic standpoint, that when the situation is reversed and 10 plaintiffs are assumed to have related claims, of a value of $100 each,
against one defendant, allowance of offensive collateral estoppel to plaintiffs following the
first litigation to go to judgment against the defendant will increase the latter's statistical
expectancy of liability from $500 to $900. The conclusion reached in this note is that offen-,
sive and defensive collateral estoppel are equally unfair in disproportionately allocating the
risk of erroneous outcomes against the common party.
Though, as far as this author is qualified to say, the statistical demonstrations in the note
are sound, its conclusion is flawed in not taking sufficient account of the realities of litigation or procedural context. Even if its statistical premises are accepted, the note's conclusion that defensive collateral estoppel places an error risk on plaintiffs equal to that which
offensive collateral estoppel places on defendants is not legally realistic. That is so, first,
because plaintiffs have much more freedom to join multiple defendants in a single action,
and thereby avoid the reduction in their statistical expectancy of recovery consequent upon
allowance of defensive collateral estoppel, than defendants have to consolidate actions
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among other forms of relief, were sought in the stockholder action
could be collaterally estopped from relitigating before a jury the
material falsity of the proxy statement based on the prior adverse
determination of the question by the judge as trier of fact in the
equitable action brought by the SEC.
The Court accepted the basic premise contended for by the defendants, namely, that the scope and meaning of the jury-trial
right must be ascertained by reference to the so-called "historical
test," under which the necessary inquiry is whether a given claim,
although unknown in England and America at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted, is in essence sufficiently similar to what was
comprehended in the term "suits at common law" as to render the
seventh amendment guarantee applicable. 5 There was no question
but that the stockholders' claim in Parklanewas, in this sense, essentially a "suit at common law," since money damages were
sought as a remedy for statutorily defined fraud. If the defendants
were properly denied a jury trial in this case, that could only be
because common law courts in the late eighteenth century would
have given preclusive effect to a prior determination of a common
issue by a court of equity. Relying in part upon its own prior decisions which either held or assumed that there was such an effect,36
brought against them by plaintiffs with related claims, and thereby avoid the enhancement
of their statistical expectancy of liability consequent upon allowance of offensive collateral
estoppel. Second, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conjure up cases where a single plaintiff
would have claims against multiple defendants closely enough related for collateral estoppel
to apply but at the same time so unrelated that recovery against one or more of the latter
would not preclude or reduce recovery against the others by virtue of the rule of damages
against double recovery for the same harm. This rule significantly diminishes the difference

between the plaintiff's statistical expectancy of recovery as that is affected by the allowance
or disallowance of defensive collateral estoppel. No such diminution is applicable to offensive collateral estoppel, since when multiple plaintiffs rather than multiple defendants are
involved there is no rule corresponding to the one against double recovery to narrow the
difference.

These objections aside, it is likely that notions derived from probability theory are as
little pertinent to problems of procedure as are analogies from games. This is because the

validity of litigation rests upon premises which have little in common with the premises of
statistics. While the probabilistic risk of error must be acknowledged, the outcome of a single trial free from legal error and abuse of judicial discretion is commonly regarded as entitled to conclusive effect, even when human life is at stake. If a verdict in a single trial of a
criminal case is sufficient to send the defendant to the gallows, it is difficult to see why a
verdict in a single trial of a civil case should not be taken as reliable enough to dispose, in

whole or in part, of related claims.
I "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
35 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 450-52 (3d ed. 1976).
" 439 U.S. at 333 (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (collat-

eral estoppel effect assumed)); Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198 (1849) (prior de-
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and in part upon the historical research of David Shapiro and
Daniel Coquillette5 7 the Court concluded that the Parklanedefendants could be constitutionally deprived of trial to a jury of the
liability issues previously adjudicated in the SEC proceeding, and
hence that the seventh amendment posed no obstacle to collateral
estoppel. In so concluding, Justice Stewart's opinion reiterated
prior language of the Court to the effect that the seventh amendment "[w]as designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial
in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details."$8 This distinction between fundamentals and incidentals as related to what the seventh amendment
preserves was required because it was conceded on all sides that,
under eighteenth-century practice and until the recent general
abandonment of the mutuality doctrine, collateral estoppel could
not have been invoked against the Parklane defendants, without
which they would have been entitled to jury trial.3 9 The precise
termination in equity proceeding held to have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent legal
action); Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109 (1821) (prior determination in equity proceeding held to have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent legal action).
3 439 U.S. at 333 (citing Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 26, at 448-58). Under eighteenth century English practice, it seems that equity courts did not reciprocate by according
preclusive effect to prior determinations in common law actions. See Millar, The Premises
of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L.
Rzy. 238 (1940). This has no bearing, of course, upon the seventh amendment issue
presented in Parklane.
" 439 U.S. at 337 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)).
" While conceding that it is only "the substance of the right of jury trial that is preserved
....
" 439 U.S. at 344 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Justice Rehnquist, was "unwilling to accept the Court's presumption that the complete extinguishment of petitioners' right to trial
by jury can be justified as a mere change in 'procedural incident or detail,'" id. at 350. His
opinion emphasized that prior decisions of the Court had established the peculiarly historical nature of the right to jury trial, and stressed the point that willingness to modify that
right to accomodate ongoing procedural innovation would inevitably lead to its erosion. His
reasoning was remarkably similar to that of Justice Marshall's dissent in Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149 (1973), a case which held a six-person jury empanelled pursuant to a local rule
consistent with the seventh amendment, a holding in which, oddly enough in view of his
historicist Parklanedissent, Justice Rehnquist joined. The thrust of Justice Marshall's dissent in Colgrove was that considerations of efficiency and functionality cannot be imported
into areas necessarily determined by history. Id. at 166-88. It might be thought at least
equally odd that Justice Stewart, the author of the Parklaneopinion, joined in Justice Marshall's historicist Colgrove dissent, and that the latter registered no dissent in Parklane.
If one is willing to grant the seventh amendment propriety of directed verdict and summary judgment in their modern forms merely because of their vague antecedents in 1791
common law practice, as Justice Rehnquist appears to be, it seems difficult to cavil at nonmutual collateral estoppel as having any greater effect in extinguishing, as opposed to incidentally depriving a litigant of, the right to jury trial. The difference between impermissibly
extinguishing, and incidentally curtailing, entitlement to jury trial is analytically meaningless; these are simply conclusory expressions registering approval or disapproval of the re-
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question was whether there is any meaningful difference between
estopping a defendant, and hence depriving him of a jury determination when the precluded issue was previously resolved by a
judge, at the behest of a party who was a plaintiff in the prior
proceeding-a technique that had already been found to pass constitutional muster 4q-as opposed to when the estoppel is asserted
by a stranger to the earlier litigation.41 Concluding that there is
not, Justice Stewart wrote:
The petitioners have advanced no persuasive reason, however, why the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should depend upon whether or not mutuality of parties is present. A
litigant who has lost because of adverse factual findings in an
equity action is equally deprived of a jury trial whether he is
estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same
party or a new party.... In either case there is no further

factfinding function for the jury to perform, since the common
42
factual issues have been resolved in the previous action.
As a logical matter, it is difficult to find fault with this proposition, which was critical to the Court's disposition of the seventh
amendment question. The only caveat that might be noted is that,
as long as collateral estoppel was confined within the banks of mutuality, cases in which it would work to deprive a party of a jury
trial when it would otherwise be available were extremely rare.
That is because, in by far the greater number of situations where
one party has legal and equitable claims against another so closely
sult. The problem is obviously one of degree and hence least amenable to principled judicial
resolution. If anything, the gulf between non-mutual collateral estoppel and its 1791 antecedent, mutual collateral estoppel, seems to be narrower than that which separates the modern motion for a directed verdict, approved in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372
(1943), against a seventh amendment challenge, from its 1791 analogue, the demurrer to the
evidence.
"' See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Smith v. Kernochen,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 198 (1849); Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109 (1821).
41 The question of the right to jury trial in the context of non-mutual collateral estoppel
would seem to be no different whether it is invoked offensively or defensively. The critical
factor is whether allowing the estoppel on the basis of prior findings by a judge deprives the
party against whom it is invoked of the opportunity to have the issue passed upon by a jury
in subsequent proceedings. The Supreme Court, when it first approved defensive, non-mutual collateral estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), did not advert to the jury trial question, apparently because
neither party had demanded a jury in the district court even though money damages were
sought in addition to an injunction. There was no published opinion of the district court in
Blonder-Tongue, but the court of appeals opinion refers at several points to "findings" on
various issues below. See University of Illinois Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc., 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1970).
42 439 U.S. at 335-36.
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related as to implicate identical issues upon which preclusion
might operate, the claimant is compelled by the modernly prevalent, transactionally grounded doctrine of merger and bar to join
such claims in a single action.'3 Once joined, it is clear that jury
trial can be demanded as to any common issues." Thus Parklane's
dispensation with the mutuality limitation will have the effect of
sanctioning a vast increase in the number of instances in which
collateral estoppel will operate to deny to parties the option of demanding a jury. This has relevance, however, only to its fairness
and propriety as a procedural technique, since the matter of
whether it infringes upon a constitutional right cannot plausibly be
thought to depend upon the frequency with which it comes into
play.
The principal significance of the Parklane decision lies, not in
the approval of collateral estoppel on its particular facts, which
militated about as strongly in favor of the result reached as any
that could be imagined, but in its more general pronouncements
concerning the appropriate role of case-by-case discretion in the
implementation of preclusion techniques by federal courts. Specifically, Parklane carried forward the process begun in BlonderTongue45 and dispensed with the mutuality rule in the context of
offensive uses of estoppel, where the rule had been thought most
justified as a reliable safeguard against unfairness to defendants
against whom multiple related claims are asserted in individual actions. Casting aside the flat prohibition of the rule in the interest
of judicial economy, the Court would have defendants in such circumstances henceforth rely for fair treatment upon the prudent
and judicious exercise of particularized, equitable discretion.
Discretion, at least of the judicial variety, is as dependent upon
guiding principles and at least vaguely delineated outer limits as it
is independent of fixed rules. The Parklane opinion was at some
pains to at least adumbrate the criteria which trial court judges are
to consider in deciding whether to permit or deny estoppel. Among
those mentioned were whether the party against whom estoppel is
urged had adequate incentive to contest the common issues vigorously in the prior litigation, whether there were available to him
therein procedural advantages substantially equivalent to those
otherwise available in the present proceeding,'4 whether the relia"- See note 5 supra.
4" Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
4'See note 19 supra.
48 Trial to a jury might have been regarded as an obvious procedural advantage available
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bility of the preclusive determination is cast in doubt by inconsistent determinations of the same issues in other actions, and
whether a plaintiff relying upon estoppel failed without adequate
reason to join in the previous adjudication. 47 The source from
which these criteria were drawn was acknowledged to be section 88
of the proposed Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 48 From the
wording and structure of that section,49 it is apparent that the cri(out of collateral estoppel) to the Parklane defendants in the stockholder action which was
not available to them in the SEC equity suit. Somewhat surprisingly in view of the encomia
heaped upon the role of the civil jury by the Court in a line of decisions of relatively recent
vintage, Justice Stewart's opinion in this case stated that "the presence or absence of a jury
as factfinder is basically neutral... ." 439 U.S. at 332 n.19. By this was presumably meant
that there is no reason to believe that a jury would view the common issues more favorably
to the defendants than did the judge in the SEC action. But one is then led to wonder what
all the fuss was about in cases like Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), and
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), which commanded, contrary to long
established practice, that deference be accorded to jury findings on issues common to legal
and equitable claims consolidated in a single action. The Parklane Court might have decided, had it been so inclined, that trial to a jury is a significant procedural difference, even
if not an evident, a priori advantage to the defendants, without necessarily deciding that
jury trial was required by the seventh amendment. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356
U.S. 525 (1958) (jury trial held to be required as a matter of policy rather than constitutional mandate). The Court in Parklane could reasonably have decided that the defendants
were entitled to a jury determination of the common issues as a matter of fairness and
sound judicial policy, simply because of the mere possibility that a jury might make a practical difference as to how those issues were resolved, without thereby committing itself to a
holding that the historical seventh amendment test constitutionally compelled it. Some of
the factors which the opinion did specify as relevant procedural advantages, such as a more
convenient forum in the subsequent litigation, obviously favor the defendant but others,
such as availability of copious discovery devices, would seem as "basically neutral" as a jury.
IT The logic of the last factor is not entirely clear. It would seem to have no necessary
bearing on the reliability of the prior determination of common issues or on the ability or
incentive of the defendant to contest them. The Parklane opinion generally approved RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975), where this factor is
included as one weighing against estoppel. The rationale given in the pertinent comment is
more a fuller statement of this factor than an explanation for its inclusion. See id., Comment e. Unless the failure to join can be shown to have significantly reduced the defendant's
incentive to contest the common issues to the point where their determination becomes of
doubtful reliability, counting it as a factor against allowance of collateral estoppel appears
to rest upon nothing more than a game-like conception of fair play. See note 33 supra. On
the other hand, although not assigned this function in either the Parklane opinion or the
Restatement, the joinder requirement might well be necessary to prevent Parklane-type
preclusion from subverting the integrity of certain kinds of class actions. See text accompanying notes 51-57 infra.
Is 439 U.S. at 330-31 nn.13-16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1975)).
49
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party... is also
precluded from doing so with another person unless the fact that he lacked full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or unless circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The circumstances to which consideration should be given include those enumerated in §
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teria are intended to, and must necessarily, be administered in the
flexible and non-categorical manner of principles which merely
guide decision in individual cases, and not in the fashion of rules
mandating particular results as, for example, the rule of mutuality,
ridden with exceptions as it is, mandates that there be no collateral estoppel when that condition is not satisfied. Apart from the
decidedly open-ended character of much of the language of this
section, it is clear that none of the enumerated "circumstances" is
to function as a flatly prohibitory rule disallowing estoppel. Since
the non-specificity of section 88 is further broadened by the only
slightly less non-directive language of section 68.1,50 which sets
forth considerations relevant to whether issue preclusion should be
allowed even as between the same parties, the result is substantially to recast collateral estoppel as an equitable technique for the
economical management of litigation rather than a cluster of common law rules mechanically determining the preclusive consequences of judgments.
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE

Parklane DOCTRINE

Balancing the often opposing goals of efficiency in the handling
68.1 and also whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible
with an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the issue that were not available in the first action and that might likely
result in the issue's being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between himself
and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with
another determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among
the parties to the first action that were not present in the subsequent action, or
was based upon a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another
party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would
inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal
rule upon which it was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances that make it appropriate that the party
be permitted to relitigate the issue.
For the text of this section, see note 14 supra.
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of an ever-mounting mass of claims against scrupulous fairness to
litigants in every case is obviously the most urgent challenge facing
modern civil procedure. Consolidation of actions having sufficient
factual or legal elements in common to make their disposition in
one proceeding both manageable and economical of judicial resources has been the principal expedient resorted to by courts in
their effort to meet this challenge. Historically, a variety of devices
fashioned by equity, including the requirement of joinder of certain categories of parties, impleader and interpleader, intervention,
and the class action, have been available, increasingly so under
merged procedure, to overcome the cumbersome, duplicative, and
fragmentary model of adjudication that was a hallmark of the common law. Parklanecan usefully be viewed as having legitimated, at
the highest level of the judicial system, yet another consolidation
device in the form of non-mutual collateral estoppel freed from its
restricted application to strictly defensive uses. Because consolidation is always fraught with difficulties of manageability and possibilities of unfairness to individual litigants, it is not surprising
that, on the occasion of its being launched upon the seas of federal
practice, this newly christened device should be accoutered with a
plenitude of equitable discretion. The converse of the traditional
mutuality role could not, by its very nature, be formulated as a
rule of general application, prescribing collateral estoppel in every
instance of identity of issues.
What might be referred to as the free-form movement in procedure, of which Parklaneis an exemplar, is not without its hazards
and drawbacks, however. One of the hazards posed by the technique sanctioned by Parklaneis that it might prove mercurial, difficult to keep within bounds and prevent from infiltrating the
proper domain of other consolidation techniques with which it will,
so to speak, be in competition.
Preeminent among the latter would seem to be type of class action which Parklane-type preclusion most closely resembles-that
provided for by Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where the plaintiff class is composed of a number of claimants having claims wherein "[t]he questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ..... 51 By definition, claims involved in this kind of class action are separate and independent in
the sense that no such commonality of interest or relationship ex' FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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ists among members of the class as would preclude their being
maintained in individual actions. Prior to the 1966 amendments of
the Rules its antecedent was unofficially known as a "spurious"
class action. Its most objectionable feature, which the 1966 amendments of Rule 23 were largely designed to inter, was that judgments in such actions were binding only upon parties who initially
appeared or subsequently intervened. 2 Intervention was permitted
even after judgment, which meant that absentee members of the
"class" would have every reason to await the outcome of trial and
then intervene to get the benefit of the judgment if it was
favorable to their claims. This "wait and see" option was deemed
so unfair that the Rule was amended to provide that judgments in
class actions of this kind should bind all those whom the court
finds to be members of the class to whom notice has been directed,
and who have not requested exclusion from the class. 53 Thus, a

balance was struck between the institutional interest in the enforced consolidation of numerous related claims and the freedom
of individual claimants to conduct their own litigation; with considerable deference being accorded the latter. By "opting out,"
however, any "collateral" benefit from a favorable judgment that
might be obtained in the class action was forfeited.
If the Parklanedoctrine does not necessarily disinter the spurious class action supposedly buried for good in 1966, it may at least
loosen its shrouds. Unless circumscribed in ways not suggested in
the opinion, Parklane could have the effect of resurrecting nonmutual preclusion by means of collaterally estopping defendants
faced with multiple related claims in subsequent independent actions rather than by post-judgment intervention in a spurious class
action. In Parklane itself, no difficulty of this sort was presented,
since the SEC does not act as a class representative and no class
action certification was possible.5 But it may be appropriate to ask
what will happen in multiple related claim situations following
Parklane when the original action is eligible for class action certification. If certification is granted, then the least that must be done,
if the integrity of this kind of class action is to be preserved, is to
deny Parklane-typepreclusion to any persons with related claims
'2 See

id. 23, Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966); Kaplan, Continuing

Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1), 81 HARv. L. Rpv. 356, 385-92 (1967).
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). See generally Advisory Committee Note of 1966 to Rule 23 as

Revised in 1966 in 3B J. MooRE, supra note 2,
54

See note 31 supra.
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who receive notice of the action and elect to be excluded. Otherwise, they might reasonably deem themselves better off by remaining outside the class so that they would not be barred by an adverse judgment, but would retain the option of invoking collateral
estoppel when they bring their own independent actions if the
judgment is favorable. Ironically, after Parklane,claimants in such
circumstances might have reason to account themselves fortunate
if, for some reason or other, no notice of the class action is directed
to them.
Other questions are prompted by the potential of the Parklane
doctrine for encroachment upon the field hitherto reserved to the
separate-but-related-claim class action. For instance, will defendants, faced with the prospect of defending against multiple related claims, be heard to insist that the initial action brought
against them be maintained as a class action so that other claimants will be barred by any judgment adverse to the class? What are
the responsibilities of the trial judge if the initial plaintiff filing an
individual action resists being cast in the role of class representative, preferring instead to "paddle his own canoe"? If the judge
determines that the defendant's interest in being protected against
the "heads I win, tails you lose" feature of Parklane preclusion
should be protected,55 may an unwilling plaintiff and his counsel
be dragooned into service as named representative of a class comprising all those having related claims? If the plaintiff does not
volunteer for this role, will he nonetheless have to bear the substantial additional financial burden, in the form of added counsel
fees and administrative costs necessitated by directing notice to all
class members, or can this burden be shifted to a defendant upon
whose motion class action certification is granted? Is willingness to
shoulder these burdens, which normally must be borne by the representative plaintiff,56 a condition of the defendant's avoiding
Parklane preclusion should the judgment in the initial action be
favorable to the plaintiff?. If certification is granted at the defendant's insistence and over the opposition of the initial plaintiff,
and the additional counsel fees and notice expenses are shifted to
the defendant in the first instance, upon whom will they ultimately
fall if the defendant finally prevails on the merits?
All of the foregoing questions are likely to be raised when the
number of related claims are sufficient to satisfy the "numerosity"
See note 33 supra.
" Eisel v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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requirement of Rule 2357 for class certification, so that in a sense
the formal class action provided for by that rule will be more or
less directly "in competition" with what might be thought of as the
kind of informal class action apparently countenanced by Parklane. But what if there is the prospect of only three or four related
claims, a situation wherein class certification would almost certainly be denied? It would seem somewhat anomalous that a defendant should be exposed to the more onerous sort of preclusion
envisaged by Parklaneand deprived of the quid pro quo to which
he is entitled in a "formal" class action (i.e., a judgment unfavorable to the class is binding upon all members thereof to whom notice is directed) 58 simply because there are potentially four, rather
than forty or four hundred, related claims against him. Justice
Stewart's Parklane opinion" and section 88 of the new Restatement" both attempt to deal with this difficulty by saying that failure, without good reason, to join or intervene in the initial action is
a factor to be weighed against allowing collateral estoppel at the
instance of a plaintiff who has failed to do so. Except in situations
like Parklane, where there was a special impediment to joinder or
intervention, 1 intervention, at least, will nearly always be a theoretical possibility. It is not amiss to ask how much difficulty or inconvenience in intervening a plaintiff who subsequently invokes
Parklane preclusion must show as a condition of being excused his
failure to have done so. A district court decision, handed down after Parklane, blandly excused plaintiffs who had failed to intervene, though it was conceded they might have done so without any
evident difficulty, and granted estoppel on the liability issues, reasoning that the defendants might just as easily have moved to consolidate the actions.2 The teaching of this case seems to be that
the duty to attempt to achieve the maximum feasible consolidation
57 FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a) ("Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.. ."). On the numerosity requirement gener-

ally, see 7 WIGHT & MILu,

FaEDRAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1762 (1972).

See text accompanying note 52 supra.
" "The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in
the earlier action.. . a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel."
439 U.S. at 331.
o See note 49 supra. The "prior joinder" requirement thus seems to be premised upon
Parklane-type preclusion being considered a kind of faute de mieux consolidation technique, to be resorted to only when preferred techniques, such as intervention or maintenance of a class action, are shown to have been impracticable.
,1See note 31 supra.
42 W.J. Roberts & Co. v. S.S. Hellenic Glory, 471 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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in the initial-action -will be at least~as likely to be -imposed upon
defendants seeking to escape Parklane preclusion as upon plaintiffs seeking its benefit, at least where -all of the relevant litigation
is concentrated in a single district. Even when the litigation is not
thus concentrated, it is an open question whether defendants will
be placed under some obligation to move for interdistrict transfer
and subsequent consolidation in the transferee district.63
The advantage which doubtless attracted the Supreme Court to
the vastly broadened type of preclusion sanctioned in Parklane
was clearly the gains in judicial economies which it would seem to
promise. The ideally favorable circumstances in which Parklane
posed the issue-primarily the fact that the litigation in which estoppel was invoked was pending at the time when, and in the same
district court in which, the preclusive SEC action went to judgment-may have caused the Justices to overestimate the savings it
would accomplish, and to underestimate difficulties that might be
encountered in its administration. The factors which must be considered by the trial judge in a subsequent action to determine
whether the defendant had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
the common issues in prior adjudication are many, and present difficult questions of degree. Some of them, such as whether a plaintiff who urges estoppel had sufficient reason for not joining in the
prior adjudication, and whether a prior judgment was based upon a
compromise verdict, are likely to implicate questions of fact and
thus require an evidentiary hearing for their resolution.6 Illustrative of the complications which can ensue is a post-Parklanecase,
Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,65 wherein a defendant drug manufacturer,
faced with the prospect of being precluded from relitigating the
'3 See 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).

" See note 49 supra. The possibilities for confusion on a wholesale scale would be vastly
compounded should it ever be held that questions of fact as to whether the "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" standard was met in a prior adjudication are for the jury in the
litigation where estoppel is invoked. Since the Court in Parklane held, by implication, that
the standard had been met as a matter of law, it had no occasion to mention this problem.
In a concededly different, though not wholly unrelated, context there is at least one court of
appeals case holding that whether a plaintiff is barred from maintaining a claim because

omitted as a compulsory counterclaim in a prior action in which the same parties were reversed is a question of waiver or estoppel, and that the jury in the second action must
consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the omission of the counterclaim to
determine whether they amounted to a waiver or estoppel. Dindo v. Whitney, 451 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1971).
8

84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The problems illustrated by this case cannot, however,

be laid to the charge of Parklane.Since the prior judgment invoked as preclusive was ren-

dered by a state court, the federal court was obligated to adhere to the preclusion law of
New York. See note 70 infra.
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issue of the harmfulness of one of its drugs on the basis of a prior
judgment against it in a New York state court, was permitted by
the district court judge to take the depositions of two of the jurors
in the New York action in an effort to establish that the verdict
was reached on the basis of compromise. The decision to allow
such discovery of juror misconduct in another forum was stated to
be limited to situations where the party seeking discovery
"through permissible investigation apart from the compulsion of
any court order ...

demonstrates a factual basis for a belief that a

judgment asserted against it as collateral estoppel was based on a
compromise verdict ....

.,6" The potential for harassment of ju-

rors which this procedure opens up is obvious, to say nothing of
the intense embarrassment to the judicial system if discovery of
this sort "impeaches" a verdict rendered in another court system
for purposes of collateral estoppel, while at the same time the information disclosed cannot be used to obtain relief from the ver67
dict itself.

Experience with the practical workings of the Parklanedoctrine
may reveal that the savings of judicial resources will be less than
hoped for. In the absence of settlements, which Parklane preclusion might well encourage, there will almost always have to be a
jury trial in subsequent adjudications on the often complex issues
of causation and damages. It is at least doubtful whether juries
having to resolve those issues, which are often intertwined with issues of liability, will be spared great amounts of time and effort
simply by not having to grapple with evidence relevant solely to
the latter. Much of whatever time and effort is saved by preclusion
of liability issues may be partially offset by the necessity for evidentiary hearings by the court to determine whether the "full and
fair opportunity to litigate" 68 standard was satisfied in the prior
litigation on the basis of which estoppel is invoked.
Remitting various questions of procedure formerly controlled by
rule to a regime of discretion, always presumed to be enlightened
and principled, has proved a seductively attractive recourse in recent years. This trend has been facilitated by an abandonment of
the nineteenth-century concept that "vested rights," akin to property, inhere in such essentially procedural institutions as judg"84 F.R.D. at 382.
47 Under the law of New York, id. at 381, as under federal law, FED. R. Evm. 606(b), it
appears that jurors are incompetent to give testimony regarding jury deliberations for purposes of impeaching their verdict.
See note 49 supra.
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ments.69 Abandoned as well, and with little lament, is the insistence, also associated with nineteenth-century jurisprudence, that
law in all its aspects should achieve the degree of precision and
independence of individual judgment and intuition then so much
admired in the physical sciences, with the inexorable, mechanistic
workings of their rules. Modern American law has long since
turned its gaze from the natural to the social sciences, and is no
longer beguiled by the illusion of impersonal decisionmaking,
whereby axiomatic rules, absolute and unqualified in their operation, are simply applied to the data at hand.
The migration from the domain of rule to that of discretion is
not without its costs, however. Viewed from one perspective, assigning questions to be handled as matters of discretion represents
a concession to practical necessity and a departure from the norm
that decisions upon which important rights and interests depend
should be made under the discipline of legal precepts of reasonable
specificity susceptible to uniform application. The rule of mutuality, among others, long and well served the interests in certainty
and predictability by enabling litigants to anticipate the collateral
consequences of judgments. ParkIane completed the process of
abolishing that rule for the federal courts, except in limited circumstances where the judicial code commands adherence to the
preclusion doctrine of a state which retains the mutuality requirement in whole or in part.7 0 What was swept away by this decision
could obviously not be replaced with a rule of opposite tenor-a
rule prescribing that parties invariably and forever be estopped
from litigating an issue once decided against them. The Supreme
Court instead adopted the only course open to it, once it determined to jettison the mutuality rule, and that was to invest lower
court judges with broad discretion to decide under what circumstances a losing litigant should thereafter be subject to collateral
estoppel in subsequent actions. The practical necessity which induced this delegation of weighty authority was the recognized fact
that the circumstances when offensive issue preclusion should be
permitted are too multifarious to be captured and expressed in a
rule.
The kind of discretionary authority conferred upon trial judges
in Parklanediffers in significant ways from many, if not all, of the
See note 16 supra.
70

28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). This statutory partial implementation of the full faith and

credit clause of the Constitution requires federal courts to attach the same consequences to
state court judgments as does the law of the state of rendition.
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types of discretion they have traditionally been accorded. In such
matters as the myriad of detailed questions which arise as to the
conduct of trials, whether to grant or deny a new trial, whether to
permit extensions of time or amendments of pleadings, whether to
grant or deny interlocutory relief and the terms upon which it is
conditioned, when to terminate discovery, and the like, an ample
measure of discretion is accorded trial judges as a matter of practical necessity. It is understood that the considerations bearing upon
judicial decisionmaking in these areas are far too variant and unforeseeable to permit satisfactory handling by reference to hard
and fast rules. Additionally, although rulings of this kind can often
be decisive of the outcome of any given case, these matters have
about them the appearance of being somewhat peripheral and incidental, presenting issues which could reasonably be resolved either
way; decisions about which, in favor of one party or another in the
course of a trial, are likely to "wash out" in a more or less neutral
fashion. Because of these characteristics, the practice has been
long established that appellate courts will subject decision in these
traditionally discretionary areas to a far less stringent standard of
review, reversing only for clear abuse, than is applicable to decisions governed by legal rules. Litigants, or at least their counsel,
are usually perfectly aware of how unpromising is an appeal directed solely to rulings made in one or another of these areas.
Except for the multifariousness and imponderable quality of the
factors to be considered, the kind of trial court discretion contemplated by Parklane,and the consequences stemming from its exercise, share little in common with the foregoing categories of discretion sanctioned by tradition. Trial judge decisions on whether to
permit Parklane-typepreclusion will be anything but peripheral or
incidental-indeed, they will usually be central and crucial to the
outcome of the case. It is difficult to imagine a defendant, in a position like those in Parklane, against whom collateral estoppel is
allowed being deterred from appealing the final judgment following
determination of damages by any sense that, as with, for example,
a ruling cutting off presentation of cumulative evidence, the decision was one that might reasonably have gone either way. When
the estoppel decision is for the plaintiff, there will almost surely be
an appeal in every case, and it is quite likely to be an interlocutory
appeal, which is especially consumptive of judicial resources as it
does not necessarily obviate a second appeal from the final judg-
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ment.7 1 It would be unfortunate, but not wholly surprising, if

whatever judicial economies are achieved under the Parklane doctrine at the trial court level prove to be substantially offset by the
proliferation of appeals it engenders. To the extent that these appeals are of the interlocutory variety, the offsetting losses are likely
to be particularly serious.
The difficulties presented by appeals from Parklane rulings are
apt to prove considerable. Despite the language in Justice Stewart's opinion about committing the question of whether to grant or
deny estoppel to the trial judge's discretion," it is open to some
doubt whether appellate courts will in fact accord as much leeway
in reviewing such rulings as they customarily do with respect to
most matters traditionally assigned to trial court discretion. For
one thing, estoppel rulings will not be in any sense peripheral or
incidental. To the contrary, they will usually be dispositive of the
case. They will not be presented in a "firing line" context, wherein
trial judges must rule in haste, and where there is little disposition
to second-guess them at the appellate level. Most importantly, perhaps, the various factors bearing upon estoppel rulings will normally be as accessible to appellate as to trial judges, and as authoritatively weighed by them. Unlike, for example, rulings on motions
This is because a trial judge who is in any doubt as to whether the appellate court
would affirm his ruling allowing estoppel would presumably be loath to go forward with the
trial on the damages. If a Parklane ruling were upset on appeal from final judgment it is
doubtful whether upon remand there could properly be a "split trial" limited to issues of
liability. See generally Wright, ProceduralReform: Its Limitations and its Future,1 GA. L.
REv. 563 (1967). In addition to Parklane itself, the ruling on offensive estoppel precipitated
an interlocutory appeal in Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d
494 (2d Cir. 1979). Appeals by plaintiffs from rulings denying estoppel are likely to come up
only in the form of interlocutory appeals, to the extent they are permitted. If a plaintiff's
estoppel motion (i.e., typically a motion for partial summary judgment on some or all of the
liability issues) were denied, and interlocutory appeal were not sought or were not allowed,
it is difficult to see how the issue could be presented on appeal from final judgment. If final
judgment were, despite the disallowance of collateral estoppel, for the plaintiff any error in
such disallowance would obviously be rendered unreviewable. If the plaintiff ultimately loses
on the merits, it is nearly inconceivable that any appellate court would reverse and deprive
the defendant of his verdict obtained in actual litigation, even if it considered the failure to
permit estoppel an abuse of discretion. Realizing that their appeal rights may otherwise be
lost, plaintiffs who are denied the benefits of Parklane-type estoppel will presumably always
seek certification of the ruling as a controlling question of law for purposes of interlocutory
appeal. Trial judges will be under no compulsion to certify the question, nor will courts of
appeals necessarily allow interlocutory appeal. Some sense that such appeals should be allowed, at least at the behest of plaintiffs, may arise, however, from the awareness that plaintiffs will otherwise receive less protection from appellate review than defendants against
erroneous rulings on collateral estoppel motions.
" See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
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for new trial, Parklanerulings will not turn upon any sort of "feel"
or situation-sense as to which trial judges, as ones "who have seen
and heard," are better situated to have the last word.
Application of the Parklanedoctrine will inevitably increase the
degree of uncertainty and enhance the element of fortuity in the
litigation of multiple related claims. It will do so partly because,
despite what has just been stated about the probable standard of
appellate review, Parklane rulings must incorporate some discretionary latitude if the doctrine of that case is to achieve any of its
expected benefits. To the extent this does eventuate, however, to
precisely that extent will the outcome of cases, many of them likely
to involve enormous stakes, depend quite directly upon the sound
exercise of discretion and the weighing of largely imponderable
factors by individual trial judges.
A good deal of more or less unreviewable discretion seems to be
a necessary, and in many ways no doubt a positive, element in the
method of conducting modern litigation. The great problem, of
course, is to keep the respective workings of rule and discretion in
a stable balance, avoiding both rigidity and excessive fluidity
which, if viewed too indulgently, can verge on lawlessness. The sort
of discretion authorized by the Parklane decision may well prove
particularly difficult to retain within manageable bounds and prevent from becoming the agent of serious miscarriages of justice.
Fortuities, such as the apparently happenstance discovery of the
allegedly compromise verdict in Katz," are apt to bulk especially
large when achieving judicial economies, through after-the-fact
consolidation, requires splicing together, for limited purposes, the
results of two separate adjudications.
The Parklane doctrine is still at a very early stage in its judicial
career. Some jurisdictions, notably New York, have had longer experience with it, though with what measure of success this writer is
not now prepared to say. Reflection upon it at this date may well
be somewhat premature. There does, however, seem to be some
reason to doubt whether it will work as easily and as effectively, or
that it will achieve as much, as its framers-the Justices comprising the Parklane majority-may have been lead to believe by the
ideally propitious circumstances of the case itself. Future refinement and elaboration, and perhaps here and there a bit of patchwork repair, will almost certainly be called for as the doctrine is
worked through future cases. While no full-fledged retreat and re7S

gee text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
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turn to the mutuality rule would seem to be in prospect, it may
well be that some more narrowly crafted rules will have to be formulated to keep the Parklane doctrine under decent restraint and
to preserve its integrity as an instrument of judicial statesmanship.

